Source: How This Happened – Demystifying the Nile: History and Events Leading to the Realization of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD). Author:  Dereje Befekadu Tessema

Introduction

On the eve of inauguration, fireworks burst over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, illuminating more than just concrete and turbines. They illuminated a story of resilience where fourteen years in which Ethiopia endured sanctions, financial blockades, diplomatic pressure, and even open threats of sabotage and bombing, voiced from Cairo to Washington.

From 2011 to 2025, the GERD tested the limits of statecraft, sovereignty, and survival. Negotiations veered from hope to hostility, with episodes at the UN Security Council, U.S.-brokered deals, and African Union summits. Yet Ethiopia pressed forward, funded not by global financiers but by its own citizens, who gave salaries, savings, and sacrifice. On this day, over 130 million Ethiopians affirm what they have always known: It is Our Dam.

What you’ll read in Installment #4:

  • How Ethiopia navigated sanctions, embargoes, and diplomatic isolation while keeping construction on track.
  • Why repeated threats — from Cairo to Washington — only hardened national resolve.
  • The milestones of resilience: the 2015 Declaration of Principles, the first three fillings, turbine launches, and now, inauguration.

The story of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) is more than the story of a hydroelectric project. It is the chronicle of a nation’s resilience, a people’s determination, and the test of sovereignty in the face of unprecedented external pressure. From its groundbreaking in 2011 to the eve of its inauguration in 2025, the GERD stands as a living monument to Ethiopian perseverance against diplomatic headwinds, economic sanctions, international threats, and even the specter of war.

The launch of the GERD on April 2, 2011, by Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, came at a time of regional upheaval. Egypt was reeling from the Arab Spring, Sudan was consumed with internal transitions after the secession of South Sudan, and the Nile Basin was in flux. Ethiopia seized the moment, dusting off the old “Project X” designs and contracting Salini-Impregilo to build what would become Africa’s largest hydroelectric facility. The decision shocked Egypt, which for decades had claimed exclusive rights to the Nile under colonial-era treaties and the 1959 bilateral accord with Sudan. From the outset, Cairo’s rhetoric was belligerent—officials threatened that “all options are on the table,” including military action against the dam. Ethiopian leaders and diaspora communities received these warnings cautiously, yet the project pushed ahead.

To demonstrate transparency and technical rigor, Ethiopia proposed the formation of an International Panel of Experts (IPoE) in 2011, composed of engineers, hydrologists, and environmental specialists from Ethiopia, Sudan, Egypt, and abroad. After a year of reviews, site visits, and analysis, the IPoE concluded in 2013 that the dam’s design was sound, though it recommended further studies. Ethiopia pressed on, while Egypt demanded a halt. The divergence signaled the beginning of years of contentious negotiations. When Ethiopia diverted the Blue Nile in May 2013 to allow construction, Egyptian officials again hinted at sabotage. Some politicians were caught on live television suggesting arming rebel groups inside Ethiopia or bombing the dam.

The tumult continued as Egyptian leadership shifted to Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in 2014. His government, facing the reality of Ethiopia’s progress, sought to reframe the dispute diplomatically. At the 2014 African Union summit, Ethiopia and Egypt issued the Malabo Declaration, affirming dialogue and cooperation. This paved the way for the 2015 Declaration of Principles (DoP), signed in Khartoum by the leaders of Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt. For the first time, Egypt formally recognized Ethiopia’s right to build the dam, even as it sought assurances on downstream flows. Yet negotiations soon bogged down, particularly over technical studies and the baseline water shares that Egypt and Sudan insisted on preserving from the 1959 treaty.

From 2017 onward, tensions escalated. Egypt sought World Bank mediation, but Ethiopia rejected external arbitration, insisting on African-led solutions. The impasse deepened. In 2019, Egypt turned to Washington, where U.S. President Donald Trump and the World Bank attempted to broker a deal. The draft agreement strongly favored Egypt, restricting Ethiopia’s filling timetable and binding it to long-term release guarantees. Ethiopia, under Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, refused to sign, citing sovereignty and intergenerational implications. The U.S. reacted harshly—suspending $130 million in aid—and President Trump publicly declared that Egypt “will end up blowing up the dam.” This reckless statement shocked international observers and angered Ethiopians, who saw it as incitement to war.

The diplomatic battleground shifted to the United Nations. In June 2020, Egypt elevated the matter to the UN Security Council, framing the GERD as a threat to “international peace and security.” For the first time in its history, the Council debated a transboundary river dispute. Ethiopia, represented by Ambassador Taye Atske Selassie, firmly rejected the UN’s involvement, arguing that the African Union was the rightful forum. His speech underscored Ethiopia’s existential need for the project—86% of Nile waters originated in its highlands, yet its people lived mainly in the dark, reliant on firewood and lacking electricity. For Ethiopia, the GERD was not optional but a developmental necessity.

Amid these global confrontations, Ethiopia forged ahead. In July 2020, it announced the successful completion of the first filling of the reservoir, storing 5.4 billion cubic meters. Celebrations erupted across the country, with the slogan “#ItIsMyDam” uniting citizens at home and abroad. Teachers, farmers, civil servants, and the diaspora had all contributed—through bond purchases, salary sacrifices, and donations—to fund the $5 billion project without external financing. The GERD had become more than infrastructure; it was a national symbol of pride and unity.

Subsequent years saw continued resilience. In 2021, Ethiopia carried out the second filling, despite renewed UN Security Council debates and Arab League resolutions condemning its actions. Again, Ethiopia insisted that the AU-led process was the only legitimate platform. In February 2022, the dam began generating electricity as the first turbine came online, followed later that year by the second turbine and the third filling, bringing total storage to nearly 22 billion cubic meters—about 30% of capacity. Prime Minister Abiy framed the milestones as steps toward energy independence for millions of Ethiopians and as a contribution to regional integration.

The path was not easy. Ethiopia endured sanctions, withheld aid, embargoes, and relentless diplomatic campaigns orchestrated from Cairo to Washington, D.C. At each juncture, Ethiopia faced existential questions: Could it resist pressure without becoming isolated? Could it reconcile national aspirations with regional stability? The answers came not through capitulation but through persistence. The Ethiopian government repeatedly emphasized dialogue, even as it resisted unfair terms. At home, the people—despite political divisions and economic hardship—remained steadfast, seeing in the GERD a project that transcended party and ethnicity.

By the time the GERD reached inauguration in 2025, Ethiopia had weathered 14 years of challenges. The dam had survived the threats of bombing, the machinations of global powers, and the weight of international institutions. More importantly, it had redefined Ethiopia’s image in Africa and the world: not merely as a land of poverty and conflict but as a nation capable of undertaking and defending a transformative project of continental scale. The GERD story demonstrated that resilience is not the absence of struggle but the capacity to endure, adapt, and prevail.